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I. Introduction with 
remarks on Germany
1.  While other parts of the EU Damages Directive1 
have been widely heralded as genuine game changers for 
private enforcement in Europe (most notably, the rules 
on disclosure of evidence), Article 19, which deals with 
consensual settlements and their effects on subsequent 
actions for damages, has received far less attention—and 
perhaps undeservedly so. Even in the three European 
jurisdictions that are considered to be leaders in private 
enforcement (the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany), 
the courts still face tremendous difficulties in assessing and 
1 Directive 2014/104/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union, OJ 
L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1.
quantifying damages, often leading to protracted multi-
year litigation and battles between economic experts. By 
contrast, settlements sometimes offer an efficient and 
expedient way for resolving competition law claims, at 
least in B2B settings. This is in line with experience in 
the US where, according to some estimates,2 over 90% of 
all treble-damages cases are eventually resolved through 
settlements, often even before the discovery process is 
initiated. Of course, the US achieves this impressive result 
with the help of a very specific set of rules and incentives, 
first and foremost the no-contribution rule,3 but this only 
reinforces the idea that the rules governing the effects of 
settlements matter greatly. In other words, Article 19 of 
2 See J. M. Connor, Forensic Economics: An Introduction with Special Emphasis on Price 
Fixing, Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 4 (2008), pp. 31 et seq.
3 The US Supreme Court in a landmark decision in 1981 held that there is no basis, either 
in the federal antitrust laws or in federal common law, for allowing federal courts to create 
a right of  contribution among antitrust defendants (Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff  
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.  630 (1981)). This has generated significant incentives for 
defendants to settle early. 
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AbstrAct
Hand in hand with an ever-growing amount of cartel damage litigation all across 
Europe, settlements have become an increasingly important tool for resolving 
private competition law disputes. However, while the majority of disputes concern 
infringements committed jointly by more than one party, many settlements are 
concluded bilaterally between only one injured party and one of the co-infringers, 
leading to the difficult question of what effects the settlement would have on joint 
and several liabilities. In the past, these complexities have been amplified by the 
fact that different Member States gave different answers to this question, making 
it difficult to draft settlements in cases concerning multistate infringements. In 
this respect, Article 19 of the EU Damages Directive took a stab at harmonizing the 
rules across the EU. A conference held at the University of Würzburg, Germany, 
on May 5, 2017, took a closer look at the way the Directive has been implemented 
into the laws of five Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the UK), and discussed the likely impact on settlements as a dispute resolution 
mechanism.
De pair avec un plus d’un nombre constamment croissant de litiges en matière 
de dommages et intérêts dûs aux cartels dans toute l’Europe, les règlements sont 
devenus un outil de plus en plus important pour résoudre les conflits privés en 
droit de la concurrence. Cependant, bien que la majorité des litiges concernent 
des infractions commises conjointement par plus d’une partie, de nombreux 
règlements sont conclus bilatéralement entre une seule partie lésée et l’un des 
co-contrevenants, ce qui mène à la question difficile de savoir quels effets le 
règlement aurait sur les responsabilités conjointes et diverses. Dans le passé, 
ces complexités ont été amplifiées par le fait que différents États membres ont 
donné des réponses différentes à cette question, ce qui rend difficile la rédaction 
de règlements lorsqu’une infraction concerne plusieurs Etats. À cet égard, l’article 
19 de la Directive 2014/104/UE a essayé d’harmoniser les règles dans l’ensemble 
de l’UE. Une conférence tenue à l’Université de Würzburg, en Allemagne, le 5 
mai 2017, a examiné de plus près la manière dont la Directive a été mise en 
œuvre dans les lois de cinq États membres (France, Allemagne, Italie, Pays-Bas 
et Royaume-Uni) et a discuté de l’impact probable sur les règlements en tant que 
mécanisme de règlement des différends.
Effect of consensual 
settlements on subsequent 
damages actions
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the Directive and its transposition into Member State 
laws deserve a closer look.
2. At the outset, it is important to note that Article 19 only 
deals with settlements which do not include all co-infringers 
as parties. Practical experience confirms that this is by far 
the most relevant setting—competition law disputes are 
usually settled bilaterally (on a confidential basis) between 
the injured party and one of the co-infringers, and they 
invariably relate only to the individual harm caused by the 
settling co-infringer. This raises a number of potentially 
problematic issues for both sides: 
(1)  For the settling co-infringer, the natural 
question is whether he can now close the books 
over the case, which depends partly on (a) potential 
residual liability towards the injured party, and 
partly on (b)  potential liability in contribution 
claims towards the other co-infringers. 
(2)  The injured party, in turn, will ask whether 
he can still recover additional amounts from the 
other co-infringers.
3. Article 19 answers question (1) with a qualified “yes,” 
stating that a settling co-infringer may still need to 
compensate the injured party if  the other co-infringers 
are unable to do so, but allowing this residual liability to 
be expressly excluded under the terms of the settlement. 
Question (2), too, is answered in the affirmative, but the 
injured party will need to deduct from its claim against 
the other co-infringers “the settling co-infringer’s share of 
the harm.”
4. In giving these answers, the Directive follows the general 
concept of “proportionate share reduction” that can be 
traced back to the French 18th-century jurist Pothier4 
and is quite familiar in many jurisdictions, including 
the Netherlands5 and Germany,6 but not the UK,7 and 
has already been embraced in real-world settlements 
of competition law disputes. However, it seems that the 
Directive skips the hardest questions entailed by this 
concept in competition law settings and also adds an 
unnecessary layer of complexity. 
5.  As for the hardest questions, many competition law 
practitioners dealing with settlement agreements have 
scratched their heads over what it means to reduce claims 
brought against non-settling co-infringers by “the settling 
co-infringer’s share of the harm.” Obviously, the share 
of the harm is a rather elusive concept, as Article 11(5) 
of the Directive makes abundantly clear when stating 
that this share “shall be determined in the light of [the 
4 See J. Kortmann and R. Wesseling, Two Concerns Regarding the European Draft Directive 
on Antitrust Damage Actions, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, August 2013(1), at pp. 7–8.
5 Article 6:14 of  the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek.
6 See, e.g., Federal Court of  Justice, judgment dated 21 March 2000 – Case IX ZR 39/99, 
and judgment dated 22 December 2011 – Case VII ZR 7/11.
7 Under English law prior to the Directive’s implementation, a “covenant not to sue” was the 
only tried method of  agreeing on a bilateral settlement while keeping claims against other 
co-infringers intact, see H.  Beale, Chitty on Contracts, Vol.  1: General Principles, 31st 
ed. 2012, at para. 17-017.
co-infringer’s] relative responsibility for the harm caused 
by the infringement of competition law.” In practice, 
therefore, settlements often do not require the injured 
party to reduce its claim by the “share of the harm,” but 
by a more tangible and concrete amount, for example 
any damages stemming from products sourced from the 
settling co-infringer, and perhaps a defined share of any 
umbrella damages. Of course, a settlement that is framed 
in this manner cannot be fully reconciled with the rules 
on “proportionate share reduction”—it will inevitably 
leave the door open for potential contribution claims 
from other co-infringers against the settling co-infringer. 
This, indeed, was one of the reasons why the German 
legislator, in implementing Article  19 into German 
law with the recently published 9th Reform Act to the 
Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), treated 
the concept of “proportionate share reduction” as the 
default rule, but explicitly left it to the parties to agree on 
other mechanisms.8 
6.  As for the unnecessary layer of complexity, 
Article  19(3) 2nd subparagraph seems to require a 
tick-the-box exercise to exclude residual liability of the 
settling co-infringer in case other co-infringers are unable 
to pay (“may be expressly excluded”). While it is certainly 
useful if  the parties devote attention to this question by 
making it the subject of an express clause in the contract, 
many real-world settlements are concluded without 
expert lawyers at the table, for example in connection 
with annual renegotiations of delivery terms. Those 
settlements are often strongly worded (“All damage 
claims by A against B relating to the widgets cartel are 
hereby comprehensively settled following a payment of 
EUR X”), but will—in the future—inevitably lead to 
discussions whether the wording was “express” enough 
to exclude residual liability. Again, the German legislator 
tried to give the parties more wiggle room by omitting the 
qualifier “expressly” in its transposition into German law 
(Section 33f(2) GWB), but this will not prevent disputes 
about whether this Section needs to be interpreted in 
conformity with European law.
7. Of course, in the grand scheme of things, the two points 
mentioned hardly limit the achievement of the Directive 
in an area that is just as important for effective private 
enforcement as an effective court system. Following the 
implementation in Member State law, it is now possible 
in cross-border cases to take advantage of a theoretically 
sound mechanism (“proportionate share reduction”) and 
rely on its universal recognition throughout all Member 
States. This is indeed a significant step forward.
T. P.
8 See Section 33f(1) GWB (“Unless otherwise agreed”). Ce
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II. France
8.  Article  19 of the EU Directive aims at promoting 
consensual settlements. For this purpose, it introduces 
provisions in favour of the settling infringer. Recital 51 
states that the settling infringer should not be placed in 
a worse position vis-à-vis its co-infringers than it would 
otherwise be without the consensual settlement. However, 
it pays attention to the non-settling co-infringers because 
the risk of imbalance could turn against the settling 
infringer. The provisions of this Article did not raise a 
great deal of interest in France because of the lack of 
culture of mass settlement. They have been implemented 
into French law by two articles in the Commercial Code: 
Articles L. 481-13 and L. 481-14. The word “transaction” 
is used. It may be considered as a broad term, like an 
umbrella term. Two kinds of relationships may be 
distinguished: the relationship between co-infringers and 
the settling injured party; and the relationship between 
co-infringers and the non-settling parties.
1. Impact of a settlement 
on the relation between 
co-infringers and the settling 
injured party: Article L. 481-13
9. According to Recital 51, non-settling infringers should 
not be unduly affected by settlements to which they are 
not parties. The injured party has to reduce the settling 
infringer’s share to the harm cause to him. The French 
government transposed Article 19, paragraph 1, by Article 
L. 481-13, paragraph 1, in this way: “The injured party 
who made a transaction with one of the joint and several 
co-debtors can only claim against the other co-debtors, 
who are non-parties to the transaction, the amount of his 
damage reduced by the part of the damage attributable to 
the transaction party co-debtor.”
10.  Article  19, paragraph  2, as it is explained by 
Recital  51, supports a non-contribution rule which is 
essential to the protection of the settling infringer: he 
should in principle not contribute to the non-settling 
co-infringers. Article 19, paragraph 1, is implemented by 
paragraph  2 of Article L.  481-13: “(...) co-debtors, who 
are non-parties to the transaction, cannot claim from the 
settling party co-debtor a contribution for the sum they 
paid to the injured party.”
11.  Then, Recital  51 intends to ensure the right to 
full compensation. That is the ground of Article  19, 
paragraph  3. This is implemented by Article L. 481-13, 
paragraph 2: “Unless otherwise stated, the injured party 
can claim from the transaction party co-debtor payment 
of the remaining sum attributable to co-debtors, who 
are non-parties to the transaction, after unsuccessful 
prosecution.” We may question the effectiveness of this 
provision dictated by Article 19. Because of the phrase 
“unless otherwise stated,” the settling infringers will 
certainly use a style clause in order to block this possibility.
2. The impact of a 
settlement on the relation 
between co-infringers and 
non-settling injured parties: 
Article L. 481-14
12. Recital 52 explains the intention of the EU Directive 
drafters as far as Article 19, paragraph 4, is concerned. 
We might consider that the relationship of this provision 
with paragraph 2 is not clear. Recital 52 seems to shed 
light on the accurate object: contribution for damages 
paid to non-settling injured parties, and not contribution 
for damages paid to settling injured parties as before. It 
is so specified: “(...) when settling co-infringers are asked 
to contribute to damages subsequently paid by non-settling 
co-infringers to non-settling injured parties, national 
courts should take account of the damages paid under a 
consensual settlement.” 
13. Article 19, paragraph 4, is not so clear. It does not 
mention “damages paid to non-settling injured parties.” 
Article L.  481-14 follows its wording: “In order to fix 
the amount that a co-debtor can claim for contribution 
from the other joint and several co-debtors, the court takes 
into account all compensation amounts already paid by 
co-debtors by execution of a transaction made with the 
injured parties.” 
14.  In conclusion, we may regret the wording of the 
whole of Article 19, which could have been written in a 
clearer and more effective way. The French government 
did not manage to implement the potentialities of these 
provisions in a better way.
C. P.
III. Italy
15.  The Italian law, first of all, provides to the useful 
function of listing all the situations in the Italian legal 
system where the concept of “consensual settlement” 
under the Directive may apply. The same provision 
(Article  15) also makes specific reference to the rules 
which, within such different legal situations, already 
provide for the statute of limitations being interrupted: in 
such regard, it is important to note that, while Article 18 
of the Directive provides for a “suspensive effect” of the 
settlement procedure, the internal Italian rules mentioned 
by the implementing law, actually contemplate an 
“interruption” of the running period. Where, needless to 
say, the difference is that the statute of limitations will 
not just start running again from where it was left, but 
will have to start all over again from the very beginning. 
16. The Italian rule also reminds the reader that in case 
of proper arbitration, the natural conclusion cannot 
be limited only to the interruption of the statute of 
limitations, as the arbitral panel, under Italian law at 
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least, has the specific duty to pronounce a decision 
and thereby define the dispute. Also, having Italian law 
provided for possible compensations against the state 
in case of unduly lengthy court proceedings (as an 
effect of rather punitive ECHR case law concerning the 
malfunctioning of the Italian judicial system), Article 15 
expressly considers that the relevant interruption will not 
be accounted for such purpose. 
17.  The rule adopted by the Directive concerning 
allocation of damages in case of settlements (which, it 
should be mentioned, corresponds anyhow to the case 
law of the Italian courts, even though this predictably has 
not been shaped by antitrust cases) allows for the carve-
out of the settled amount and the relevant immunity for 
the settling defendants, establishing that this shall be 
pro quota (and not pro tanto). This, as provided by the 
Directive, will shield the settling party both from the 
injured party’s and from its non-settling joint tortfeasors’ 
potential claims. It will also benefit the other defendants 
in so far as the settling party’s share of liability will be 
carved out from the aggregate amount of recoverable 
damages. 
18.  The intended effect of this rule is, as stated under 
Clause  51 of the Preamble, to “encourage settlements.” 
Now, on the one hand, one may question the sagacity of 
“encouraging settlements” (it is unclear why the EU legal 
system should take a critical position vis-à-vis judicial 
deliberation); and, on the other hand, one may wonder 
whether such system really has the effect of encouraging 
settlements. It is a well-known fact that in the US legal 
system the “contribution” system is expressly rejected, 
precisely for the purpose of putting the potentially 
settling parties in a competitive relationship against one 
another and, therefore, making them run to the plaintiff  
for reaching a settlement as soon as possible. 
19.  Also, it goes without saying that determining the 
share of the settling defendant’s liability will not in any 
event always be without its fair share of complications. 
While this complexity is not unique to antitrust, the very 
complicated factual issues that already arise in allocating 
fines among tortfeasors in the European Commission’s 
and NCAs’ practice, give us a hint of the predictable 
future intricacies of judging in this area. 
20. Finally, it should be reminded that in the US system 
litigating cartel damages has given rise to the widespread 
use of the so-called “judgment-sharing agreements” 
(JSAs). In such covenants, defendants agree in advance 
on their relative responsibility for any antitrust damages 
awarded at trial against any of them. In fact, in the US 
system JSAs are mostly used to apportion liability (so, 
in a sense the Directive would make them irrelevant). 
In such regard it is perhaps interesting to remind that 
the Court of Justice, in its Siemens Österreich decision 
opined: “(…) where there is no contractual agreement as 
to the shares to be paid by those held jointly and severally 
liable for payment of the fine, it is for the national 
courts to determine those shares, in a manner consistent 
with EU law” (§  62) which, in a way, could be read as 
an implicit recognition of the validity of JSAs (though 
admittedly in a different factual situation)—and, in a 
rather contradictory fashion, establishing ex cathedra the 
validity of such arrangements, while ostensibly leaving 
it to the national court to determine how to apportion 
liability in their absence. 
21. The most notable content of a JSA would normally 
be to (i) apportion contribution among defendants and 
(ii)  regulate any settlement by, e.g., establishing that a 
settling defendant shall extract from the contentious 
claim the whole amount attributable to it (such stipulation 
leading to an obligation for the settling defendant to 
include the relevant clause in the settling agreement).
22. In this regard, it is perhaps interesting to ask oneself  
whether, in such JSAs, parties may possibly derogate to 
the discipline provided for by the Directive and, therefore, 
by the different national systems, including with regards 
to the pro-quota allocation of the settlement outcome.
C. O.
IV. Netherlands
23.  The Netherlands already had a system to deal with 
settlements in the context of joint and several liability before 
the implementation of the Directive. The system of the 
Directive is not unsimilar, but has one important difference. 
Under the existing system a settlement worked in favour 
of the other debtors, but had no impact on the remaining 
claim.9 Suppose the total amount of claim is 100. There are 
three debtors A, B and C, who are jointly and severally liable 
and whose respective shares are 40, 30 and 30. If debtor A 
settles with the claimant for 20 as a full and final settlement, 
the claimant could seek recourse for 80 against B and C. 
Now suppose that B and C both pay 40 each. This means 
that they “overcontributed” 10 each. They can then still turn 
round to A and claim their “overcontribution” from him. A 
then ends up paying 40 after all.10 
24. The claimant and A can avoid this by an additional 
juristic act. The claimant and A may agree that the 
claimant undertakes to reduce his claim against B and C 
with the amount of the total debt that concerned A and 
could have been claimed from him as a contribution.11 
This means that the claimant can claim no more than 
60 from B and C jointly and severally. In their internal 
relationship, B and C each must contribute 60, which 
equals the claimants remaining claim. A is cut out 
entirely by his settlement with the claimant. 
25. Whereas our existing laws obtained this effect by way 
of an agreement with the creditor and settling debtor, 
Article  19, paragraph  1, Directive requires that this be 
made mandatory. This is now provided for in Article 
6:193o, paragraph 1, Directive. 
9 Cf. Art. 6:14 Civil Code.
10 Art. 6:10, para. 2, Civil Code.
11 Art. 6:14 Civil Code. Ce
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26. As a result, the settling injured party can subsequently 
only claim from non-settling infringers.12 It is specifically 
made clear that the claim of the settling injured party is 
thereby decreased with the share of the settling defendant, 
not just with the amount of the settlement, even if  the 
amount that should have been contributed is higher than 
the settlement amount.13 The non-settling infringers 
cannot claim contribution from settling infringers.14 
27.  Only if  a non-settling infringer is “not capable” of 
compensating the remaining damages, in accordance 
with the reduced claim, is the liability of the settling 
infringer for the damages reinstated.15 This reinstation, 
however, may be contracted away.16
F. K.
V. United Kingdom
28. Where an injured party settles with one (or more) of a 
number of jointly and severally liable co-infringers, there 
is always the possibility that the amount for which the 
injured party and the settling infringer(s) settle falls short 
of the settling infringer’s (or infringers’) share of the loss 
or damage caused. 
29.  In such a situation, the residual loss must be 
borne either by (i) the injured party, or (ii) the settling 
co-infringer(s), or (iii) the non-settling co-infringers. 
30.  The United States has opted for alternative  (iii) 
in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials. The injured 
party may pursue the claim against the non-settling 
co-infringer(s), and only has to subtract any payments 
actually made by the settling infringer(s). However, there 
is no right to contribution under federal law.17 The effect 
is that plaintiffs can “pick off” defendants one after the 
other: early settling co-infringers may get favourable 
terms (often in exchange for inside information about the 
cartel; and the money is often used to finance the action 
against the others). The more parties settle, the greater 
the bill for the remaining defendants becomes. There is 
a ratchet effect, an expensive version of musical chairs: 
defendants seek to settle as early and cheaply as possible. 
As a countermeasure, defendants often enter into 
judgment-sharing agreements—an agreement that seeks 
to make up for the lack of statutory contribution rights 
by creating contractual contribution rights (but is itself  
not unproblematic from a competition law perspective).18 
12 Art. 6:193o, para. 2, Civil Code
13 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 17.
14 Art. 6:193o, para. 2, Civil Code.
15 Art. 6:193o, para. 3, Civil Code.
16 Art. 6:193o, para. 4, Civil Code
17 Texas Industries v. Radcliff  Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
18 C. R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, Duke Law Journal 2009, Vol. 58, 747.
31. English law has traditionally opted for alternative (ii) 
and allocated the residual burden to the settling 
co-infringer(s): While the settlement prevents the 
injured party from seeking further damages from the 
settling co-infringer(s), the injured party may seek full 
compensation from the non-settling co-infringers (minus 
the settling amount19), and the non-settling co-infringers 
may seek contribution from the settling co-infringers 
under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.20 
32.  However, again the parties may vary the effects by 
contractual agreement. First, it is possible, though 
usually not intended by the settling parties, to release all 
co-infringers, so that the injured party bears the residual 
loss (resulting in an extreme version of alternative (i) 
instead, in which the injured party foregoes all further 
claims). Secondly, it is possible to negotiate a “sales 
carve-out,” in which the injured party will no longer 
claim damages for the settling infringer’s direct and 
indirect sales; as Hollway et al. point out, “[t]his lessens, 
but does not remove, the risk of a contribution claim by 
a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant,”21 
for example because it may still be the case that the 
share of some co-infringers is not recoverable. Thirdly, 
the settling co-infringer may negotiate for an indemnity 
from the injured party “against any liability to which [the 
settling co-infringer] may become subject relating to the 
subject matter of the compromise.”22 Such an indemnity 
achieves, indirectly, alternative (i): The injured party may 
pursue the full claim against non-settling infringers; the 
non-settling co-infringers may pursue a contribution 
claim against the settling co-infringer(s); and the settling 
co-infringer can in turn claim against the injured party 
under the indemnity.
33.  The Damages Directive, in Article  19, chooses 
alternative (i): the claim of the injured party is reduced by 
the settling infringer’s share of the harm inflicted on the 
injured party. The non-settling infringers may not seek 
contribution from the settling infringers. Exceptionally, 
the injured party may go back to the settling infringer(s) 
after all for a second helping, but only where (1) the 
remaining share of the claim cannot be recovered from 
the non-settling infringers, and (2) the settling parties 
have excluded this possibility expressly in their settlement 
agreement. An unanswered question to which Article 
19 gives rise is why the settling infringer would not want 
to exclude this residual liability, and whether it would 
not have made more sense to imply this wish to exclude 
19 See Jameson v. Central Electricity Generating Board [2000] 1 A.C. 455, 472 (per Lord Hope 
of  Craighead, quoting from Tang Man Sit v. Capacious Investments Ltd. [1996] A.C. 514, 
522): “A third limitation is that a plaintiff  cannot recover in the aggregate from one or more 
defendants an amount in excess of  his loss. Part satisfaction of  a judgment against one 
person does not operate as a bar to the plaintiff  (…) but it does operate to reduce the amount 
recoverable in the second action.”
20 Heaton v. Axa Equity & Law Life Assurance Society [2002] UKHL 15, [2002] 2 A.C. 329 
[4]; B. Hollway, D. Howe, P. McGahan and D. Shah, Cartel damages settlements and the 
Damages Directive: The end of  the road for contribution claims? Global Competition 
Litigation Review 2017, Vol. 10(1), 16.
21 Hollway et al., n. 12, at 16–17.
22 Such an indemnity was suggested by Lord Bingham in Heaton v. Axa Equity & Law Life 
Assurance Society [2002] UKHL 15, [2002] 2 A.C. 329 [9] (as the fifth of  five “significant 
points” to be borne in mind). Ce
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residual liability as a default; the need for an express 
provision looks like little more than a trap for the unwary.
34.  The provisions of Article  19 of the Damages 
Directive are implemented in paragraphs  39 to 41 of 
the new Schedule 8A to the Competition Act  1998. 
Paragraph  39 provides that the “settling complainant’s 
claim is reduced by the settling infringer’s share of the loss 
or damage,” “regardless of the terms of the consensual 
settlement.” Paragraph  40 provides that the settling 
complainant ceases to have a right of action against the 
settling infringer “regardless of the terms of the consensual 
infringement,” unless the non-settling co-infringer(s) is or 
are unable to pay the remaining share of the claim and 
such liability is not expressly excluded in the consensual 
settlement. Finally, paragraph  41 provides that the 
non-settling infringer(s) may not recover contribution 
from the settling infringers, regardless of the terms of the 
consensual settlement.
35.  It seems that overall the change in the approach in 
English law forced by the Damages Directive has been 
welcomed in England (which is quite a feat for any rule 
of EU law).23 On this occasion I am only slightly more 
sceptical than the English. The Coase theorem teaches 
us that in principle the default rule does not matter, 
provided only that transaction costs are sufficiently low. 
We have seen that in the US and in England parties often 
depart from the default rule, and so perhaps Article 19 of 
the Damages Directive is indeed the solution that parties 
would hypothetically bargain for. From this perspective, 
however, it is questionable whether making the position 
to a large extent mandatory instead of only providing for 
default rules was the best option. It seems that the only 
reason for making these issues mandatory would be if  
one wanted to replicate the effect that the no-contribution 
rule in the US law has; and that solution, while probably 
incentivising claimant-friendly settlements, runs counter 
the decision to pursue compensation and not deterrence 
with European damages claims. 
F. W.-v. P. n
23 Hollway et al., n.  12, at 21; see also Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, Competition Policy – Damages for breaches of  competition law – government 
response to consultation (December 2016), para. 124 (noting that Blackstone “felt that 
Article 19 represented a welcome rebalancing of  risk around CDR to ensure that it was more 
equally borne by the claimant and defendant”). Ce
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